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I. INTRODUCTION 
Without much analysis, the United States Supreme Court has imported 
common law tort and agency principles to resolve questions of vicarious 
liability under Title VII. The most prominent context for this importation of 
common law principles has been sexual harassment cases, although the issue 
of employer vicarious liability comes into play in other types of anti-
discrimination cases as well.1 The development of vicarious liability, however, 
largely reflects the Court’s unease with holding employers liable for sexual 
harassment, a form of behavior that some justices still approach as “personal” 
or “private” behavior, rather than job-related discrimination. As Sandra 
Sperino has mapped out in an earlier article,2 the early Title VII opinions 
largely assumed that employers were responsible for discriminatory acts of 
their employees. It was only after the Court recognized sexual harassment as a 
cognizable harm that it came to express doubts about vicarious liability, doubts 
that have now spilled over to limit vicarious liability in other contexts as well.  
                                                                                                                     
 * Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. 
Many thanks to my fellow participants in the Symposium and special thanks to Allison 
Haugen, Amanda Tate, and Daniella Vespoli, my research assistants, who helped me with 
so many aspects of this Article. 
 1 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191–92 (2011) (setting out 
requirements for employer liability based on the bias of subordinates in “cat’s paw” cases 
involving discriminatory discharges).  
 2 Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 
ALA. L. REV. 773, 778 (2010). 
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Largely through the importation of agency principles, the Court has 
greatly reduced the scope of vicarious liability in Title VII cases, relegating it 
to the relatively minor role of securing liability only in cases of abuse of 
formal supervisory power. Notably, in instances in which employees abuse 
their informal power—a hallmark of ordinary Title VII cases—vicarious 
liability does not come into play. The slow erosion of vicarious liability has 
meant that many discrimination plaintiffs must now prove that their employers 
were negligent in failing to respond to proven incidents of bias, a challenging 
burden of proof that likely contributes to the low rate of success of 
employment discrimination cases generally.3 This vanishing act with respect 
to vicarious liability is consequential: coupled with other notable pro-employer 
decisions issued by the Court in recent years,4 Title VII has been reshaped 
from an enterprise liability scheme to a “statutory tort,” capable of redressing a 
limited number of wrongs done to individual employees, but largely incapable 
of achieving Title VII’s broad purpose of deterring and eradicating workplace 
discrimination.  
This Article takes issue with both the Court’s importation of tort and 
agency principles and its reluctance to hold employers vicariously liable for 
discriminatory acts of employees. With respect to the Court’s decision to 
borrow agency principles, I argue in Part II that such a move was not required 
by the statutory language of Title VII and should not be understood as 
furthering congressional intent.5 Part III then turns to the case law and tracks 
the Supreme Court’s importation of agency principles and the gradual erosion 
of vicarious liability in key decisions governing employer liability in the 
sexual harassment context.6 Beyond the questionable move to rely on private 
law to determine the scope of Title VII liability, I show how the Court’s 
uptake of tort and agency principles has been selective and misguided, leading 
the Court to reach results that were neither inevitable nor desirable as a matter 
of policy.  
                                                                                                                     
 3 See Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How 
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. 
& EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 564 (2003) (observing that “employment-discrimination plaintiffs 
constitute one of the least successful classes of plaintiffs at the district court level, in that 
they fare worse there than almost any other category of civil case”); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to 
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127–28 (2009) (finding that plaintiff win rate for 
employment discrimination cases (15%) was much lower than that for non-employment 
discrimination cases (51%) and that employment discrimination plaintiffs have won 3.59% 
of pretrial adjudications, while other plaintiffs have won 21.05% of pretrial adjudications). 
 4 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) 
(rejecting mixed-motivation framework in retaliation cases); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (rejecting mixed-motivation framework for age 
discrimination cases).  
 5 See infra Part II at notes 18–45. 
 6 See infra Part III at notes 46–67. 
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Part IV examines the consequences of the Court’s privileging of 
negligence over strict liability and sets out the narrative that has emerged in 
the cases to explain and justify the narrowing of employer liability.7 In this 
narrative of similarity and continuity, Title VII violations are recast as 
“statutory torts,” making it seem appropriate to rely on longstanding agency 
and tort principles to fashion a purportedly continuous body of law to 
determine employer responsibility for the wrongful conduct of employees.  
The heart of my case contesting this narrative of similarity and continuity 
appears in Part V where I examine the crucial structural and historical 
differences between Title VII and tort law.8 Part V begins by explaining the 
key structural dissimilarities in the two regimes.9 While tort law is a system of 
dual liability in which both the offending employee and the employer are held 
liable for the employee’s tortious conduct, Title VII visits liability only on the 
employer, a feature that makes it a true enterprise liability system.10 This 
structural difference underscores why vicarious liability is such a pivotal 
feature of Title VII doctrine. In an enterprise liability scheme, such as Title 
VII’s, vicarious liability does more than provide an additional deeper pocket 
from which to secure damages; without vicarious liability, a discrimination 
victim may have no remedy at all. 
Even more notable is the difference in the identities of the plaintiffs in 
Title VII suits as compared to tort suits.11 In tort litigation, vicarious liability 
comes into play only when an injured third-party plaintiff—not an employee 
of the defendant—seeks recovery against the employer of the actual tortfeasor. 
By way of contrast, vicarious liability arises in Title VII cases when employee 
plaintiffs attempt to hold their own employers liable for the discriminatory acts 
of other employees. Vicarious liability as a tort doctrine is thus specifically 
designed to compensate outsiders for losses incurred through their interactions 
with the enterprise and its employees and not to determine the responsibility 
employers owe to their own employees. 
The difference in structure between tort and Title VII is partly the result of 
history. At common law, suits between employee and employer were placed 
into a different legal category than suits by “strangers” against employers of 
the offending employees.12 Tellingly, the infamous “fellow-servant” rule, 
along with broad judicial interpretations of the defenses of assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence, prevented injured employees from recovering tort 
damages against their own employers.13 To remedy this unfair “no liability” 
system, states enacted comprehensive workers’ compensation laws that largely 
bypassed the tort system and instituted a radical new regime of no-fault 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See infra Part IV at notes 68–83. 
 8 See infra Part V at notes 84–141. 
 9 See infra Part V.A at notes 84–90. 
 10 See infra Part V.A at notes 84–90. 
 11 See infra Part V.B at notes 91–100. 
 12 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra Part V.C at notes 101–15. 
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liability.14 However, neither tort law nor workers’ compensation ever 
comprehensively addressed harms stemming from discrimination. This gap 
was filled only in 1964 when Title VII was enacted on the heels of the civil 
rights movement and became the most significant piece of civil rights 
legislation in the twentieth century U.S. legal landscape.15 As part of a 
national initiative to eliminate racial and other forms of discrimination in 
major sectors of American life, Title VII was quite far removed from the 
classic concerns of tort law and initially afforded only equitable relief to 
victims.  
Reflecting on this history, Part VI maintains that the dominant narrative of 
similarity and continuity is misleading. In this section I tell a very different 
story about the relationship between Title VII law and tort and agency law—
one of contrast and change—that emphasizes the distinct features of Title VII 
and resists the facile characterization of Title VII as a statutory tort. In this 
alternative story, rather than being as an appendage to private law, Title VII 
represents the second major intervention into the employer–employee 
relationship, on par in scope and significance to workers’ compensation. Like 
workers’ compensation, Title VII specifically addresses employee rights 
against their own employers and was needed largely because of the 
inadequacies of private law remedies.16 Resituating Title VII in this way 
challenges the logic and the wisdom of borrowing tort and agency law to craft 
liability rules for Title VII, especially with respect to vicarious liability.    
The Article concludes with a recommendation in Part VII calling on 
Congress to enact a new Civil Rights Restoration Act that would hold 
employers strictly liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees, free of 
any restrictions.17 Such a reform has the virtue of simplifying Title VII 
doctrine and restoring the enterprise liability scheme contemplated in the 1964 
Act. Most importantly, making vicarious liability a prominent feature of Title 
VII law would provide a reasonable incentive for employers to take the steps 
necessary to deter discrimination, while affording a fair measure of 
compensation to victims of discrimination.   
II. TITLE VII’S DEFINITION OF “EMPLOYER” 
The text of Title VII contains no provision explicitly mandating or 
authorizing courts to apply agency or tort principles when they construe the 
Act. Instead, the textual basis for the importation of common law agency 
principles is said to be the definition section of Title VII which defines 
“employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See infra Part V.D at notes 116–41. 
 15 See infra Part VI at notes 142–61. 
 16 See infra Part VI at notes 142–61. 
 17 See infra Part VII at notes 162–63. 
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fifteen or more employees” . . . and “any agent of such a person . . . .”18 The 
definition of “employer” is critically important because Title VII liability 
generally runs only against “employers.”19 Thus, unless the defendant can 
meet the statutory definition of an “employer,” there is no liability.  
Putting aside the question of whether a supervisory employee can be 
considered an “employer” for Title VII purposes and held individually liable, a 
question I discuss later,20 courts have often been called upon to decide whether 
a corporate defendant or other employing entity can be held liable for the 
discriminatory acts of its supervisory employees. Early Title VII courts had 
little occasion to grapple with the issue of vicarious liability because many of 
the first cases involved challenges to discriminatory policies that clearly 
emanated from the employer as an entity.21 Later, when courts began to 
confront claims of abuse by individual employees—such as terminations 
prompted by the biased actions of a supervisor—most courts simply assumed 
that the employer would be liable under Title VII, without stopping to decide 
the basis for such an imputation of liability.22 In these cases, courts equated 
the supervisor’s actions with the action of the employer, even when the 
supervisor was not acting in accordance with company policy. Indeed, such an 
equation reflected the literal statutory language that treats the entity and “any 
agent” of the entity on an equal basis. Under this literal reading, the actions of 
the agent are the actions of the employer, a reading that reflects the fact that a 
corporation, as a legal entity, can only act through its agents.23 
It was only when courts began to adjudicate sexual harassment claims that 
serious questions arose as to whether employers should be held responsible for 
acts of supervisors who harassed employees under their charge, often in 
violation of company policy. Employers argued that sexual harassment was 
different from other discriminatory actions—that sexual harassment stemmed 
from the purely personal motives of individual supervisors—and that 
                                                                                                                     
 18 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). The term “person” is 
further defined to include corporations and partnerships. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). 
 19 The core prohibitions of Title VII prohibit “employers” from engaging in “unlawful 
employment practices.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). Additional provisions impose 
similar prohibitions on labor organizations and employment agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(b), (c).  
 20 See infra text accompanying note 86. 
 21 See Sperino, supra note 2, at 776–78. 
 22 See Sperino, supra note 2, at 778; see also, e.g., Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 
1973 WL 339, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 1973), aff’d as modified, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 
1975) (employer held liable for discriminatory termination by supervisor). 
 23 Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson at 27, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) (“so long as a circumstance is work-related, the supervisor is the 
employer and the employer is the supervisor. The employer does not become liable through 
the supervisor; for purposes of discrimination, the two are one.”); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Members of Congress in Support of Respondent at 16, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) (“Thus, discriminatory actions of a supervisor, or ‘agent’, 
are the actions of the employer under the Title VII framework.”). 
1320 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
employers had no responsibility absent a showing of negligence on the part of 
the corporate entity.24 One of the pressing questions of the day, for example, 
was whether sex discrimination (in the form of sexual harassment) should be 
treated on par with race discrimination for purposes of Title VII liability. 
Indeed, the grassroots movement against sexual harassment was predicated on 
the core notion that sexual harassment was a form of discrimination,25 that it 
stemmed from abuse of power rather than purely private or personal sexual 
urges, and that courts should not exempt employers from responsibility for this 
species of workplace bias.26  
In its influential 1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) accepted the arguments of 
grass roots advocates and issued rules imposing strict liability on employers 
for acts of “its agents and supervisory employees . . . regardless of whether the 
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer 
and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their 
occurrence . . . .”27 It is noteworthy that the EEOC Guidelines extended strict 
liability for all agents and supervisors of an employer, rather than trying to 
determine whether a particular supervisor was an “agent” under common 
law.28 The rationale for the EEOC’s strict liability rule was a practical 
assessment of the realities of workplace bias rather than common law notions 
of employer responsibility. Under the Guidelines, employers were strictly 
responsible for the acts of persons who possessed job-created power, namely, 
those supervisors and agents who were cloaked with authority and power by 
virtue of their jobs. In contrast, with respect to the actions of other persons, 
such as co-employees, customers, suppliers or others present in the workplace, 
the employer shouldered the lesser responsibility of fulfilling its duty to act 
reasonably, by taking prompt corrective action once it knew or should have 
known of the harassment.29 The EEOC’s approach was clear and workable: it 
imposed strict liability for the actions of supervisors and negligence liability 
for all others. Most importantly, it drew no distinction between formal and 
informal abuse of power and paved the way for recognizing both quid pro quo 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Sperino, supra note 2, at 781 (discussing cases exempting employers from liability 
if the employer had a policy against harassment or corrected the harassment once 
discovering it). 
 25 See Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the 
Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 37–43 (1993) (discussing origins and early 
development of the sexual harassment claim); AUGUSTUS B. COCHRAN III, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AND THE LAW: THE MECHELLE VINSON CASE 45–48 (Peter Charles Hoffer & 
N.E.H. Hull eds., 2004) (discussing early 1970s feminist activism relating to sexual 
harassment).  
 26 See Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 133, 162–64 (2013) (discussing history of sexual harassment claims). 
 27 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1997) (rescinded after Ellerth/Faragher rulings). 
 28 Id. at § 1604.11(b) (providing that it would look to “the circumstances” to 
determine whether an individual was acting as a supervisor or an agent).  
 29 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(d)–(e) (1997). 
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forms of harassment (“sleep with me or you’re fired”) and the more common 
kinds of hostile environment harassment that did not result in immediate 
economic harm.  
Looking back, the turn to agency law in interpreting Title VII law is 
traceable to the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. During the Reagan 
administration, civil rights enforcement efforts were steered in a pro-employer 
direction and government lawyers offered the courts new theories to curb Title 
VII liability. These new theories were on very much on display in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson,30 the first Supreme Court case to address sexual 
harassment as a form of sex discrimination. 
In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States and the EEOC, 
then-Solicitor General Charles Fried and then-Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Civil Rights Division William Bradford Reynolds, argued that 
agency principles should be used to limit employers’ liability for sexual 
harassment. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency and Prosser and 
Keeton’s hornbook on torts, the Solicitor General’s brief zeroed in on the word 
“agent” in Title VII’s definition section. In marked contrast to prior 
understandings of the definition of “employer,” which had read the section as 
an invitation to interpret “employer” expansively to include informal acts of 
individuals as well as formal actions of the corporate entity, the Solicitor 
General made the claim that use of the term “agent” actually had a narrowing 
effect on employer liability.   
The Solicitor General’s brief proclaimed that “[o]ne of the fundamental 
principles of agency, as that term has traditionally been understood, is that a 
person who is another’s agent for some purposes does not therefore act as the 
other’s agent for all purposes.”31 The brief went on to consider the agency and 
tort concept of acting “within the scope of the agent’s employment,” and noted 
that an agent is generally viewed as acting within the scope of his employment 
only when he exercises “authority actually vested in him,” save in rare cases of 
“apparent authority,” where conduct by the principal reasonably misleads 
thirds parties into believing that the agent possesses such authority. In 
language that would be repeated by the Supreme Court, Fried and his 
coauthors argued that 
While such common-law principles are not necessarily transferrable in 
all their particulars to Title VII, Congress’s decision to use the term 
“agent,” rather than such words as “subordinate” or “supervisory 
employee,” surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of 
                                                                                                                     
 30 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).  
 31 Brief for the United States & the EEOC as Amici Curiae at 22, Meritor Sav. Bank 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). 
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employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held 
responsible.32  
The reliance on agency principles predictably led the Solicitor General to 
argue against providing relief to the plaintiff in the case before it. Taking the 
position that employers ought to be liable in hostile environment cases only 
when they can be shown to have “tolerated” harassment, the Solicitor 
General’s brief urged the Court to impose liability only in cases where 
employers failed to provide victims with an avenue of complaint or were 
unresponsive to an employee’s complaint.33 Particularly given the notorious 
reluctance of sexual harassment victims to report incidents of harassment to 
company officials,34 the proposed limit would likely have had the effect of 
insulating the large majority of employers that adopt internal anti-harassment 
policies and grievance procedures. 
The reasoning of the Solicitor General’s brief was considerably at odds 
with the strict liability stance taken by the EEOC in its Guidelines on Sexual 
Harassment. While the brief agreed that courts should recognize the hostile 
environment claim as a form of sex discrimination, its refusal to endorse 
vicarious liability threatened to undercut the practical significance of the 
claim. Notably, throughout the brief, the Solicitor General also expressed 
considerable skepticism toward sexual harassment charges in general, 
emphasizing the supposed “distinct” nature of the claim,35 and repeatedly 
mentioning that sexual harassment cases presented “difficult problems of 
proof,”36 involved “serious credibility issues,”37 and could become “a tool by 
which one party to a consensual sexual relationship may punish the other.”38 
Absent were the feminist-inspired arguments about the deleterious effects of 
the abuse of job-created power on women’s employment opportunities or the 
equation of race and sex discrimination that had animated the grassroots 
movement against sexual harassment. In this respect, the Solicitor General’s 
brief represented an early backlash attempt to curtail Title VII coverage even 
before the Supreme Court formally endorsed sexual harassment claims. 
The Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson39 stopped short of endorsing 
the pro-employer positions espoused in the Solicitor General’s brief. Instead, it 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 26 (“[W]e propose a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment had 
reasonably available an avenue of complaint regarding such harassment, and, if available 
and utilized, whether that procedure was reasonably responsive to the employee’s 
complaint.”). 
 34 See generally sources cited infra note 78. 
 35 Brief for the United States at 12–13, Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979).  
 36 Id. at 15. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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ruled mostly in favor of the plaintiff on liability,40 simply noting the Solicitor 
General’s position and leaving resolution of the standard of employer liability 
to another day. What has proved to be an enduring aspect of Meritor Savings 
Bank, however, is the Court’s decision to turn to agency principles as the 
proper method to determine vicarious liability under Title VII. In the section 
of its opinion which cited language verbatim from the Solicitor General’s 
brief,41 the Court confidently concluded that “Congress wanted courts to look 
to agency principles for guidance in this area.”42 Even though Justice 
Marshall, in a concurring opinion, regarded the position taken in the Solicitor 
General’s brief as “untenable,” he too did not specifically take issue with the 
Court’s reliance on agency principles and instead contended that the brief 
misread the law of agency.43   
In rejecting the strict liability approach of the EEOC Guidelines, the Court 
set on a misguided course of following the common law to determine the 
scope of civil rights protections. Its confidence that Congress’s use of the word 
“agent” provided warrant for taking in agency principles is unpersuasive, 
given the lack of legislative history and the likelihood that Congress never 
anticipated the difficult questions that would arise once claims such as sexual 
harassment were adjudicated. As mentioned above,44 the definition provision 
could just as easily have been read to underscore the simple proposition that 
employer liability is triggered not only by formal discriminatory policies of the 
entity or enterprise, but also by more informal discriminatory acts of 
individual agents or supervisors, even if unknown to the higher-level managers 
in the organization. Indeed, in a later Title IX case, the Court ruled that 
because Title IX does not contain a similar reference to “agent,” a school 
could not be held responsible for a teacher’s sexual harassment of its students, 
absent actual knowledge by the defendant school district and deliberate 
indifference to such harassment.45  
My more straightforward reading of the definition section of Title VII 
leaves open the issue of how courts should define “agent” for purposes of the 
Act, allowing the critical question of the scope of employer responsibility to 
be determined in light of the structure and history of the Act. Finally, it bears 
mentioning that, despite its textualist inclinations, the Supreme Court has not 
                                                                                                                     
 40 Id. at 72–73 (stating that because Meritor Savings Bank did not have a specific 
policy addressing sexual harassment and required employees to complain first to their 
immediate supervisor, the bank was not in a good position to argue that it should be 
insulated from liability).  
 41 Id. (“While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their 
particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to define ‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of 
an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the 
acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.”). 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. at 76–77 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 44 See generally supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
 45 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–85, 290 (1998). 
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seen fit to emphasize the word “any” in the phrase “any agent” in Title VII’s 
definition section, a word that would seem to signal a broad, rather than 
restrictive, interpretation of employer liability. 
III. ELLERTH AND FARAGHER 
In any event, the importation of agency principles authorized by Meritor 
Savings Bank was carried forward in a famous pair of hostile environment 
sexual harassment cases decided in 1998: Burlington Industries v. Ellerth46 
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.47 In those cases, the Supreme Court 
partially relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine 
employers’ liability for sexual harassment committed by employees in 
supervisory positions.48 It fashioned a complex doctrine which only selectively 
imposes vicarious liability on employers. First, the Court declared that 
automatic vicarious liability would arise only in cases in which the 
supervisor’s actions culminated in a tangible employment action, such as a 
firing, demotion, or cut in pay.49 For all other cases of supervisor-created 
hostile environments, employers could escape vicarious liability by proving a 
judicially-created, two-pronged affirmative defense, i.e., that the employer 
acted reasonably to prevent and correct harassment and that the injured 
employee acted unreasonably in failing to report the harassment or otherwise 
to mitigate his or her injuries.50 I call this strange animal “vicarious liability 
with a negligence-sounding defense.” Although these cases did not expressly 
speak to instances in which co-employees, rather than supervisors, create 
hostile work environments, the Court suggested—and has since explicitly 
stated—that vicarious liability will not be imposed in cases of co-worker 
harassment either.51 
The upshot of the Ellerth–Faragher decisions has been to limit vicarious 
liability to a very narrow class of cases. No vicarious liability for co-
employee-created hostile environments. No vicarious liability for supervisor-
created hostile environments if the employer can establish the affirmative 
defense, which employers are often able to do, even at the summary judgment 
stage.52 This leaves vicarious liability only in those instances in which a 
                                                                                                                     
 46 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 47 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 48 Id. at 793; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–56 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§§ 219, 228 (1958)). 
 49 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 50 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 51 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013). 
 52 See John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” 
Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor For Employers 
Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (2002) (indicating that “courts have effectively construed the 
defense as providing a summary judgment safe harbor against claims of supervisor 
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supervisor abuses his or her formal authority by firing, demoting or otherwise 
changing the formal status of an employee. Thus, the harms caused by 
informal abuse of power are treated as less worthy of redress and often left 
unaddressed, a regrettable outcome especially when you consider that sexual 
harassment is quintessentially a harm that flows from abuse of informal power 
and often does not culminate in economic injury.53   
Without going into too much detail, suffice it to say that, in Ellerth and 
Faragher, the Court read the Restatement (Second) of Agency as generally 
authorizing vicarious liability only when an agent of the employer, i.e., a 
supervisor, acts within the scope of his employment.54 Although they 
struggled with the issue bit,55 the Court ultimately concluded that when a 
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate, he should generally be regarded as 
acting outside the scope of employment.56 The Court based this critical 
determination on an antiquated conception of sexual harassment that viewed 
such conduct as stemming from “personal motives” unrelated to the objectives 
of the employer. Citing the Restatement, the Court reasoned that because such 
a harassing supervisor rarely has a “motive to serve” the employer’s interest,57 
agency law dictated no liability. 
In my view, this was the first mistake the Court made in transporting the 
law of agency into Title VII law. When you look more closely at cases in 
which plaintiffs have sought to hold employers vicariously liable for 
intentional torts, you find that the Restatement’s “motive to serve” formulation 
masks a split in the courts: thus, while many courts have retained the 
traditional “motive to serve” test, many other courts have rejected it and 
applied more liberal standards, centering on the risks created by the 
enterprise.58 These more liberal courts ask, for example, whether the 
employer’s act was “engendered” by the employment, or was “foreseeable” in 
the sense that it was a “predictable risk,” an outgrowth of the employment and 
                                                                                                                     
harassment”); David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your 
Employees and Cancel Your ‘1-800’ Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and 
Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1288 (2001) (finding that employers won in the majority of sexual 
harassment cases in which they sought summary judgment). 
 53 See Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive 
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 377–78, 381 (2004) (discussing importance of informal 
structures and culture of an organization). 
 54 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797–98. 
 55 In this respect, Justice Souter’s opinion in Faragher is more plaintiff-oriented than 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ellerth. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil 
Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983 and Title IX, 7 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 767–73 (1999) (contrasting Kennedy and Souter opinions).  
 56 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757 (“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a 
supervisor is not conduct within the broad scope of employment.”). 
 57 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. 
 58 Chamallas, supra note 26, at 141–46.  
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not “unusual or startling.”59 Given that sexual harassment is a pervasive and 
predictable feature of many working environments, one can readily see how 
the importation of this different test for determining “scope of employment” 
could have led to different results. Sexual harassment is sadly not unusual or 
startling and it is often acknowledged to be one of the risks of an enterprise, 
particularly when the enterprise confers power—whether formal or informal—
on some employees who then exercise it over others.  
Thus, the Court’s uptake of agency law was superficial and selective—
what one scholar has dubbed “paraphrasing”—taking in some, but not all, of a 
body of law in a fashion that has the potential to distort and oversimplify the 
doctrine.60 Notably, the Court could have reached a different conclusion in 
Ellerth and Faragher without abandoning common law agency principles. One 
reliable feature of the common law is that it is often indeterminate and 
contested. If we are being frank, we have to admit that incorporating common 
law is not likely to yield determinate results. 
I should mention that the Ellerth–Faragher Court also considered a 
separate Restatement provision that imposes vicarious liability even when the 
agent is acting outside the scope of his authority.61 The Restatement provision 
imposes liability when the agent is “aided in accomplishing” the wrong by the 
agency relationship,62 a formulation that also potentially turns on enterprise 
risk creation and job-conferred power, rather than an employee’s motive to 
serve her employer’s interest. But rather than rely on this provision to impose 
vicarious liability for all supervisor-created hostile environments, the Court 
chose instead to fashion a doctrine out of whole cloth, adopting the vicarious 
liability with the negligence-sounding affirmative defense mentioned earlier.63 
This was the Court’s second mistake. Even though the Court nominally 
retained vicarious liability as the standard for supervisor-created harassment, 
in retrospect, we can see the gravitational pull of the negligence principle in 
these cases making it seem inappropriate to hold employers responsible in the 
absence of employer fault. 
Since Ellerth and Faragher, things have only gotten worse for employees. 
The scope of vicarious liability narrowed even further when the Court declared 
in 2004 that constructive discharges prompted by sexual harassment would not 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Chamallas, supra note 26, at 142. 
 60 Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law 
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 990 (2014) (explaining how 
international trade agreements export the contours of U.S. law with subtle differences and 
distortions).  
 61 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) 
(1958), which provides that “[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants 
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless[] . . . he was aided in accomplishing 
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”).  
 62 Id. Because the Restatement (Third) of Agency no longer contains a similar “aided 
in” provision, it is very difficult to predict how the Court’s reliance on agency principles 
will affect future cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006). 
 63 See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742. 
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be considered tangible employment actions giving rise to automatic vicarious 
liability.64 The final nail in the vicarious liability coffin came in Vance v. Ball 
State University when the Court adopted a very narrow, very formal definition 
of a “supervisor.”65 Vance held that for purposes of vicarious liability a 
“supervisor” is defined as an employee empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions against an employee, i.e., has the power to hire, 
fire, or demote.66 Thus, even if the employee controls the day-to-day schedules 
and assignments of other employees—the kind of employee we normally call a 
supervisor67—by stroke of the Supreme Court’s pen, that person has become a 
mere co-employee and the employer is not vicariously liable if he or she 
harasses subordinates. 
IV. NEGLIGENCE V. STRICT LIABILITY 
This narrowing of vicarious liability is not a mere doctrinal wrinkle. 
Instead, it marks a clear choice of negligence over strict liability and has 
fundamentally re-shaped the body of Title VII law. With respect to 
accomplishing Title VII’s primary goal of deterring discrimination,68 the 
choice of negligence over strict liability is particularly regrettable. As Justice 
Ginsburg eloquently described in her dissent in Vance, the Court’s new 
emphasis on negligence has shifted the Ellerth–Faragher framework “in a 
decidedly employer-friendly direction,”69 making it even more likely that 
harassment plaintiffs will lose their cases on summary judgment. Even when 
the harasser uses his or her job-created power to make a plaintiff’s life 
miserable, after Vance, the harasser may very well be classified as a co-
employee, requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer was negligent 
through evidence that it “knew or should have known of the offensive conduct 
but failed to take appropriate corrective action.”70 
                                                                                                                     
 64 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004) (“But when an official act does 
not underlie the constructive discharge, the Ellerth and Faragher analysis, we here hold, 
calls for extension of the affirmative defense to the employer.”). 
 65 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (“We hold that an 
employer is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is 
empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim . . . .”). 
 66 Id. at 2443 (defining a supervisor as a person empowered to “take tangible 
employment actions against the victim . . . such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassign[ing] with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits”). 
 67 Id. (rejecting the “colloquial” meaning of term “supervisor”). 
 68 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 788 & n.6 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
429–30 (1971)) (explaining that Title VII’s primary objective is ending discrimination by 
deterring discriminatory employment practices).  
 69 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 70 Id. at 2456. 
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In her dissent in Vance, Justice Ginsberg selected four illustrative cases 
from different circuits to drive home her point that a standard of employer 
vicarious liability, rather than negligence, was needed to respond to the 
“workplace realities” of contemporary sexual and racial harassment. In each 
case, the harassing employee was able to adversely affect the plaintiff’s 
working conditions or employment prospects, by, for example, denying the 
plaintiff overtime,71 threatening negative performance evaluations,72 meting 
out harsh job assignments,73 or controlling work schedules to prevent plaintiffs 
from taking desired days off.74 In Ginsberg’s view, the common denominator 
in these cases was the abuse of job-created power,75 a feature that warranted 
imposition of vicarious liability, regardless of whether formal authority to hire, 
fire or promote was vested in the harassing individual.    
The central problem with predicating Title VII on a negligence standard is 
that proof of an employer’s actual or constructive knowledge is often an 
onerous burden for a plaintiff to shoulder. Even when the harassment is severe 
or pervasive, it is not uncommon for employers to lack information about the 
conduct of its individual employees, given that the higher ups in the 
organization are often far removed from day-to-day occurrences in the 
workplace. Thus, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in Vance, “[a]n employee 
may have a reputation as a harasser among those in the vicinity, but if no 
complaint makes its way up to management, the employer will escape liability 
under a negligence standard.”76 The current scheme thus places a considerable 
premium on victims reporting their harassment to designated company 
officials, even though Title VII imposes no exhaustion-of-remedies 
requirement prior to filing suit.77 The Catch-22 here is that, despite the 
expectations reflected in the legal doctrine, the social science research on 
employees’ responses to harassment has consistently found that very few 
victims pursue official complaints through employer grievance procedures.78 
By requiring plaintiffs to act in a way that departs from the response of most 
victims, the Court is thus able to circumscribe employer liability, while 
purporting to enforce the mandate against discriminatory workplace 
harassment.   
                                                                                                                     
 71 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 72 EEOC v. Crst Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 685 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 73 Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 74 Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 75 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (harassers “wielded employer-
conferred supervisory authority over their victims”). 
 76 Id. at 2464 (citing BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1378 (C. Geoffrey Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007)). 
 77 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982). 
 78 See Chamallas, supra note 53, at 373–80 (discussing the empirical literature); L. 
Camille Hébert, Why Don’t ‘Reasonable Women’ Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 
IND. L.J. 711, 731–34 (2007); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25–36 
(2005). 
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Finally, as applied by most courts, even if actual or constructive 
knowledge is proven, negligence liability will often require the plaintiff to 
pinpoint the particular precaution that the employer could have and should 
have taken that would have prevented or remedied the discrimination, for 
example, the specific screening, training, or monitoring of the offending 
employee that would have kept the harasser from targeting the plaintiff. As a 
practical matter, this kind of specific evidence of negligence can be very 
difficult for plaintiffs to come by, as such untaken precautions often lurk 
hidden in the background, known possibly only by the employer.79 In this 
respect, the negligence inquiry stacks the deck against the plaintiff, 
constituting a “steeper substantive and procedural hill to climb,” as compared 
to strict liability, and making it likely that many victims “will find it 
impossible to obtain redress.”80 It also reflects a highly individualistic 
approach to discrimination that is fixated on rooting out bad apples in the 
organization and is largely oblivious to systemic problems.   
In contrast, strict liability provides greater incentives for employers to 
think system-wide and to address the culture of the organization. The 
Canadian Supreme Court expresses it this way: 
Beyond the narrow band of employer conduct that attracts direct 
liability in negligence lies a vast area where imaginative and efficient 
administration . . . can reduce the risk that the employer has introduced 
into the community. Holding the employer vicariously liable for the 
wrongs of its employee may encourage the employer to take such 
steps . . . .81  
From an efficiency standpoint, law and economic scholars, such as the late 
Gary Schwartz, have argued that “[t]he intriguing benefit of strict 
liability . . . is that it can do a better job than a negligence regime in achieving 
that regime’s own goal of encouraging the employer’s cost-justified risk-
reducing measures.”82 
I do not mean to suggest that the Court’s importation of agency principles 
was solely responsible for producing the outcomes in Vance and other cases 
that have narrowed the scope of vicarious liability. The Court was certainly 
capable of reaching the same results without resort to agency principles. But 
reliance on agency principles did lend a kind of legitimacy to the decisions. 
                                                                                                                     
 79 See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 151–53.  
 80 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although the burden on 
harassment plaintiffs is most severe when they are harassed by employees not classified as 
supervisors, the negligence aspects of the affirmative defense also often pose a problem for 
plaintiffs in cases of informal supervisor harassment that does not culminate in a tangible 
employment action. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 81 Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, 555 (Can.). 
 82 Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious 
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1760 (1996). 
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Ironically, it also allowed the Court to deny its own agency. By relying on the 
common law, the Court in effect said, we are not narrowing Title VII 
protection because of our own beliefs or commitments; we are just following 
established rules set by others.  
Overall, the story that emerges from the Title VII vicarious liability case 
law is a narrative of similarity and continuity: the main theme is that because 
Title VII is a “statutory tort”83 it is appropriate to rest the Court’s judgments 
on longstanding common law agency rules that govern vicarious liability in 
tort cases. By doing so, it can be said that similar claims are treated similarly, 
with Title VII and the common law of agency forming a continuous body of 
law establishing employer responsibility for wrongful conduct. But, as I 
demonstrate in the next section, in the particular case of vicarious liability, this 
story does not hold up. In my view, the story of similarity and continuity is 
deficient in two respects. It significantly downplays major differences in the 
structure of tort and Title VII claims and it ignores history. This Article tells a 
different story of contrast and change that calls into question the Court’s 
readiness to resort to agency principles, and, in particular, its reliance on the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency for guidance in deciding Title VII cases. 
V. STRUCTURAL AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TORT LAW 
AND TITLE VII LAW 
The two principal reasons that agency law fails to provide a useful guide 
for determining employer liability under Title VII can be found in the 
underlying structure of the Act and the tortured history of employers’ legal 
responsibility toward injured employees. When we examine the contrasting 
structural models of liability found in tort versus Title VII and remind 
ourselves of tort law’s well-known propensity for insulating employers in 
employee suits for compensation, the wisdom of importing the common law is 
immediately called into question. 
A. Dual Liability v. Enterprise Liability 
In tort law, vicarious liability has historically been reserved for claims 
brought by an injured third party against the employer of the actual tortfeasor. 
In tort, the prototypical claim involves a stranger hurt by the tortious act of an 
employee. The doctrine of respondeat superior then comes into play to hold 
the employer vicariously liable. Importantly, in such cases, the injured party 
also has a claim against the actual tortfeasor.84 The regime is one of dual 
                                                                                                                     
 83 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(indicating that Title VII created a statutory tort).  
 84 See, e.g., P.L. v. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 666, 667–68 (Minn. 1996) (claims against 
former teacher for sexual misconduct allowed although school district and principal were 
granted summary judgment); see also Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and 
Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms, and 
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liability. Although rarely exercised, it is important to remember that the 
employer possesses a common law right of indemnity against its employee to 
recoup the damages paid to the injured party.85 The employer thus functions 
mainly as a deep pocket, with the ultimate legal responsibility residing with 
the party at fault, namely, the employee. 
Unlike the dual liability scheme of tort law—where both the employer and 
the employee may be sued—Title VII claims may be brought only against the 
employer.86 Although the Supreme Court has not yet expressly ruled on the 
issue, the prevailing view in the appellate courts is that an offending 
supervisor or individual harasser cannot be held liable under Title VII. The 
lower courts have reasoned that because small employers with fewer than 
fifteen employees are exempt from Title VII coverage, it is inconceivable that 
Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual 
employees.87 Additionally, Congress’s decision in 1991 to authorize a sliding 
scale of damages against employers based on the number of employees in the 
enterprise, without specifying any similar cap on individual defendants, 
suggests that Congress did not contemplate individual liability.88 This scheme 
comes as a big surprise to many lawyers who are used to the tort model of dual 
liability. And, of course, under Title VII, the employer has no right of 
indemnity when it pays a judgment based on the discriminatory act on the part 
of the employee. Thus, Title VII is at bottom an enterprise liability scheme.89 
It is structured to hold employing entities—not individuals—accountable for 
discrimination within the organization. Vicarious liability is thus central to 
Title VII’s operation, rather than serving as an ancillary doctrine in a system 
predicated on individual fault. 
This structural feature of Title VII is often overlooked, especially now that 
plaintiffs are allowed to recover capped compensatory and punitive damages, 
in addition to equitable relief.90 Many mistake this superficial resemblance to 
                                                                                                                     
Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 63 (2006) (“[C]ases filed by victims include two types 
of viable claims— claims against assailants themselves and claims against third parties.”). 
 85 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §333 (2000).  
 86 See Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (determining that 
employees are not individually liable under Title VII); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 
F.2d 583, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993) (indicating that employees have no personal liability 
under Title VII); Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that “every circuit that has confronted this issue . . . has rejected claims of individual 
liability”); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077–78 (3d Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (indicating no liability for individuals who are not themselves the 
employing entity). 
 87 See Fantini, 557 F.3d at 29–30.  
 88 See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1077–78. 
 89 Laura Oren, Section 1983 and Sex Abuse in Schools: Making a Federal Case Out of 
It, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 747, 804 (1997) (comparing Title VII to contemporary common 
law theories of enterprise liability). 
 90 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing punitive and 
compensatory damages for Title VII claimants). 
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tort law to mean that Title VII and tort are basically the same. And, likely 
because tort law is most familiar to lawyers, the distinctive features of Title 
VII somehow get lost in the process. 
B. Identity of the Plaintiffs 
Another significant structural dissimilarity between tort and Title VII law 
has to do with the identity of the plaintiffs. As mentioned above, in tort law, 
vicarious liability was reserved for claims brought by injured third parties 
against the employer of the actual tortfeasor.91 Unlike Title VII, vicarious 
liability in tort was never meant to govern an employee’s rights against his or 
her own employer. Instead, suits between employees and employers were 
placed in a different legal category than vicarious liability claims brought by 
strangers, a distinction that has persisted to some extent to this day.92 
Known by its Latin name, respondeat superior, vicarious liability of 
employers is in fact a very old doctrine that, oddly enough, is not derived from 
agency law.93 Some scholars believe that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
has ancient roots, perhaps an outgrowth of a Roman law principle that held 
masters liable for the acts of their slaves.94 Another theory posits that vicarious 
liability of employers in tort law is linked to a very old, rather hostile attitude 
toward paid employment that once held that, in an ideal world, people should 
do their own work. Under this reasoning, it was only by the “indulgence” of 
the law that individuals were allowed to employ other individuals to do their 
work for them and that “part of the price employers had to pay for this 
indulgence” was to accept liability for their servants’ acts.95 
                                                                                                                     
 91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §2.04 cmt. b (2006) (“The doctrine [of 
respondeat superior] establishes a principle of employer liability for the costs that work-
related torts impose on third parties.”).  
 92 Notably, even the drafters of new Restatements maintain the distinction. Third-
party claims against employers based on vicarious liability are covered in the Restatement 
of Agency, while employee suits against their own employers are covered in the new 
Restatement of Employment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006); 
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2013). 
 93 See, e.g., Jensen v. S. Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600, 604 (N.Y. 1915) (clarifying that “it 
must be remembered that [the doctrine of respondeat superior] does not rest on the doctrine 
of agency”).  
 94 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 15–17 (1945) (positing that 
the doctrine developed from rules governing Roman masters and their slaves, requiring the 
master to sell the slave or buy off the victim if a slave injured another). 
 95 See P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 21 (1967); see also 
Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 446 (N.Y. 1911) (citing famous maxim: qui facit 
per alium facit per se (“[h]e who acts through another acts himself”)); see also John H. 
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History—II, 7 HARV. L. REV. 383, 404–05 
n.1 (1894) (speculating that vicarious liability is grounded on the notion that employers use 
“substitutes” more or less at their own peril).  
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Regardless of its origin, the important point is that respondeat superior 
was not designed as a vehicle for determining an employer’s responsibility 
toward its own employees. Instead, before the nineteenth century, employer–
employee relations were governed by a traditional regime of master–servant 
which broadly defined a “servant” as a person who worked for another, 
whether or not they lived in the master’s household.96 This relationship of 
master–servant, like that of husband–wife, was primarily a relationship of 
status, not subject to tort or other private law rules governing relations 
between strangers.97 Thus, in early modern Anglo-American law, servants 
could not sue their masters for damages suffered because of the master’s 
negligent or intentional actions.98 Instead, a special duty of maintenance was 
often imposed upon masters, by which they were required to provide for the 
care of sick or injured servants, a charity-like obligation typically administered 
by parish or church wardens.99 It was only after the nineteenth century, when 
the Enlightenment ideology of free will and free labor challenged the 
traditional conception of master–servant relationships, that it became possible 
for employees to sue their employers for injuries sustained on the job.100 This 
development emerged, however, long after respondeat superior was 
established in law. Tellingly, even after it was clear that injured workers, as 
owners of their own labor, could bring suit against their employers, courts 
continued to apply restrictive doctrines to prevent recovery in such cases. As 
the next section details, in marked contrast to cases involving injured non-
employees, vicarious liability never took hold in employee–employer 
litigation. 
C. The Fellow-Servant Rule 
In the nineteenth century, employees who sued their employers for injuries 
sustained on the job rarely recovered in tort. The principal obstacle to recovery 
was a doctrine known as the “fellow-servant rule” that insulated employers 
from liability in cases arising from the negligence of a co-employee of the 
plaintiff.101 Established in the United States in the infamous case of Farwell v. 
                                                                                                                     
 96 See Evelyn Atkinson, Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relationships and 
Employer Liability Law, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 209 (2013). 
 97 Id. at 208. 
 98 Id. at 229. 
 99 Id. at 225. 
 100 Id. at 210–14. The shift in language used to describe this relationship reflected the 
changing ideology. See Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 
HARV. L. REV. 235, 235 n.2 (1914) (noting the shift in language used in English statutes 
from 1867 to 1875 in which “employer” and “workman” replaced “master” and “servant,” 
the latter terms more “familiar to the common law”). 
 101 See, e.g., Murray v. S.C. R.R. Co., 26 S.C.L. (2 McMull.) 385, 400 (1841) (holding 
that a fireman of a railroad company injured by an engineer cannot recover from the 
railroad because the company is not liable to one employee for the misconduct of another) 
see also Edgar G. Miller, Jr., Fellow-Servants, 34 AM. L. REG. 481, 481 (1886) (“[A] 
1334 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
Boston & Worcester Rail Road Corp.,102 this huge exception to vicarious 
liability barred recovery in the vast number of cases where the employer could 
not be found to be personally at fault. In tandem with two other defenses—
contributory negligence and assumption of risk—which focused on the 
plaintiff’s behavior, this “unholy trinity”103 of defenses spelled defeat for most 
injured workers.104  
A recent historical study by Evelyn Atkinson concludes that the adoption 
of the three defenses served to preserve the earlier restrictions on servants 
suing their masters that had characterized the traditional master–servant 
regime.105 Thus, even though workers attained a new legal identity as free 
actors in the market, and even though contract replaced status as the governing 
feature of employer–employee relations, the prospects of securing 
compensation for industrial injuries did not substantially change. Atkinson 
regards this as an example of “preservation through transformation,” in which 
even substantial changes in legal rules and rhetoric do little to change basic 
hierarchies of power.106 Under this account, the fellow-servant rule and the 
other tort defenses actually served to legitimize the status quo by casting the 
doctrine in a more palatable, updated form.  
In its time, the fellow-servant rule was understandably quite the 
controversial doctrine. Scholars and courts debated the proper theoretical 
foundation of the rule. Some believed it was grounded in contract principles 
and implied assumption of risk, reasoning that one of the risks that an 
employee assumed upon taking the job was that another employee might be 
negligent.107 Under this view, presumably the employee had already received 
                                                                                                                     
master is not liable to his servant for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow-
servant.”). 
 102 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49, 55–61 (1842) (adopting 
fellow-servant rule) (opinion by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw). 
 103 See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT 
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 42 (2008) (referring to the fellow-servant 
rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk as the commonly-known “unholy 
trinity” of defenses). 
 104 See Edmund Ursin, Holmes, Cardozo, and the Legal Realists: Early Incarnations of 
Legal Pragmatism and Enterprise Liability, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 537, 546 (2013) 
(“[T]hese stalwarts of traditional tort theory often left injured workers with no legal 
remedy . . . and thus without any practical hope of compensation”). 
 105 Atkinson, supra note 96, at 231–32 (noting that the fellow-servant rule provided “a 
clear analogue” to the former household relationship of master-servant); see also Francis 
M. Burdick, Is Law the Expression of Class Selfishness?, 25 HARV. L. REV. 349, 368–69 
(1912) (arguing that the fellow-servant rule “did not deprive the employee of any right 
theretofore accorded him by English law”). 
 106 Atkinson, supra note 96, at 232 (citing Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife 
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996)). 
 107 See Albert Martin Kales, The Fellow Servant Doctrine in the United States 
Supreme Court, 2 MICH. L. REV. 79, 82 (1903). 
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a payment for assuming this risk which was reflected in his wages.108 Others 
envisioned the fellow-servant rule as a kind of limited duty rule that narrowly 
restricted the scope of employers’ duties to “permanent” conditions of safety 
only, such as the duty to provide safe tools and appliances.109 From the outset, 
however, courts were careful to note that there was no incongruity between 
denying recovery to an injured employee while affording recovery to a 
similarly injured non-employee. To their mind, respondeat superior was 
founded on a “distinct principle” and “stands on its own reasons of policy” 
that were applicable only “to the case of strangers.”110 
Equally controversial was the legitimate scope of the fellow-servant 
doctrine. In an eerie resemblance to contemporary Title VII cases debating the 
definition of “supervisor,”111 early courts ruled that some supervisors and 
managers were “vice-principals,” and, as the “alter ego” of the employer, were 
not properly considered fellow-servants.112 However, many other courts 
refused to accord this “vice-principal” status to such employees, even if they 
were of higher rank than the plaintiff and even if they had the power to direct 
and control the plaintiff’s activities. In these jurisdictions, unless the 
supervisor possessed the formal power to hire or fire the plaintiff, he was 
classified as a mere co-employee, triggering the fellow-servant doctrine.113  
What was not debated, however, was the significance of the fellow-servant 
rule in American tort law. One law review writer in 1886, for example, 
declared it to be “[o]ne of the most important rules in the law of 
negligence . . . .”114 Writing in 1910, famed labor activist Crystal Eastman also 
recognized the outsized role played by the doctrine, calling it “the most vital 
distinction between the general law of negligence, and the law of negligence 
between master and servant.”115 
Thus, at common law, vicarious liability gave outsiders rights against the 
employer of the wrongdoer and did not appreciably affect the obligations 
employers owed to their own employees. Employee claims against their own 
employers were not decided on agency principles, but instead reflected the 
legacy of a master–servant regime that left employees largely unprotected 
against injury. So it seems strange, to say the least, for the Court to borrow 
vicarious liability principles for use in Title VII cases when the imported 
principles never really governed employee claims against their own 
employers. This kind of borrowing takes agency principles out of context and, 
                                                                                                                     
 108 Fifeld v. N. R.R., 42 N.H. 225, 238–39 (1860) (discussed in Burdick, supra note 
105, at 365). 
 109 Kales, supra note 107, at 94. 
 110 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49, 61 (1842). 
 111 Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
 112 See Miller, supra note 101, at 483. 
 113 Id. at 484–86. 
 114 Id. at 486. 
 115 CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 172–73 (Paul Underwood 
Kellogg ed. 1910). 
1336 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
not surprisingly, often fails to appreciate the special features of the employer–
employee relationship that set it apart from other business arrangements. 
D. The Workers’ Compensation Movement 
As the preceding section suggests, the story of similarity and continuity 
also ignores history. To provide recovery for employees injured by the 
wrongful conduct of fellow employees, states did not just tinker with the 
fellow-servant rule around the margins. Instead, in a dramatic departure from 
common law, states enacted comprehensive workers’ compensation statutes, a 
radical social reform predicated on the special responsibility of employers 
toward their workers. 
Modeled after the English Workmen’s Compensation Acts of 1897 and 
1906, the new American statutes were regarded at the time as “revolutionary 
legislation,”116 embodying an approach that was thought by legal scholars to 
be “founded largely upon a theory inconsistent with the fundamental principle 
of the modern common law of torts.”117 Although workers’ compensation 
provides monetary compensation to workers, it is quite dissimilar to tort. It 
represented a major intervention into the employer–employee relationship, 
marking change rather than continuity. Instead of simply lifting or softening 
the defenses of fellow-servant, assumption of risk, and contributory 
negligence, the workers’ compensation schemes provided recovery for injury 
irrespective of the employer’s (or any fellow servant’s) fault.118 The result was 
a form of enterprise liability, a precursor to more contemporary forms of strict 
liability.119  
Perhaps because workers’ compensation today is a taken-for-granted part 
of the legal landscape, and is often criticized as inadequate,120 we have lost 
sight of its special place in the history of labor relations and workplace injury 
law. Workers’ compensation laws did not emerge from quiet legal reform 
efforts, but instead were the product of a long political struggle and a vigorous 
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social movement. Indeed, in scope and intensity, the social movement that 
preceded legal changes to the workplace injury laws rivaled the civil rights 
struggle of the 1960s.  
The impetus for the change in the approach to injury compensation was a 
crisis in workplace accidents, the number of which had risen exponentially in 
the U.S. following the Industrial Revolution. Historian John Fabian Witt has 
described the U.S. accident crisis as one of “world-historical proportions,”121 
and one that was “vastly greater” than that experienced in European nations.122 
In the American consciousness, Witt explains, the number of industrial deaths 
and injuries seemed even to “overshadow the casualties of modern 
warfare.”123  
A major milestone in the workers’ compensation movement was a study 
conducted by Crystal Eastman for the Russell Sage Foundation.124 In 1907, 
Eastman went to Pittsburgh, one of America’s most important industrial 
cities,125 to document the toll taken by industrial accidents in the steel mills, 
coal mines, and railroad yards.126 In a highly detailed fashion, complete with 
charts and graphs, Eastman poignantly told the stories of thousands of 
industrial accident victims, inspecting their workplaces as well as talking to 
victims, fellow workers, families, relatives and neighbors.127 Her study 
revealed that most widows of workers killed on the job received no 
compensation at all and that injured workmen who survived their accidents 
fared no better.128 She recommended that Pennsylvania and other states adopt 
the no-fault workmen’s compensation model then in place in Western 
Europe.129 
Following the publication of Eastman’s study, the idea of workmen’s 
compensation spread like a “prairie fire,” according to commentators of the 
time, and Eastman herself was appointed to an influential commission in New 
York that drafted the nation’s first major workers’ compensation statute in 
1910.130 This significant legislative change in the relationship between 
employers and their workers, however, was first resisted by the courts which 
were extremely reluctant to impose new financial obligations on businesses. 
Mirroring the turmoil in the larger society, the New York courts initially 
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struck down the workers’ compensation statute before finally succumbing to 
the political winds of change. 
In 1911, a year after the enactment of the law, the Court of Appeals of 
New York invalidated the New York workers’ compensation statute in Ives v. 
South Buffalo Railway Co.,131 on the ground that the statute amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking of property in violations of employers’ state and 
federal due process rights. Echoing the Lochner philosophy that had stymied 
other progressive pieces of legislation,132 the Court refused to allow the 
legislature “to subvert the fundamental idea of property”133 by upholding what 
it deemed to be a “plainly revolutionary” enactment, as “judged by our 
common law standards.”134  
The public response to Ives was swift and disapproving, denounced at the 
time as “the greatest court controversy since Dred Scott.”135 The workers’ 
rights movement was also propelled by the tragedy of the Triangle Shirtwaist 
fire which killed 146 workers in New York City one day after Ives was 
decided.136 Thus, in 1913, the voters of New York enacted a state 
constitutional amendment specifically authorizing the state legislature to pass 
workers’ compensation legislation and lawmakers quickly did so.137 By the 
time the new legislation reached New York’s highest court, the legal tide had 
turned, in large part due to the addition of new more progressive judges, 
including Benjamin Cardozo.138 Finally, in 1915, in an abrupt reversal, the 
New York Court of Appeals upheld the new legislation, ruling that it did not 
violate the federal constitution.139 Rather than worry that the legislature was 
not hewing closely enough to principles of common law, the Court admired 
the new compulsory scheme of insurance through which, the Court reasoned, 
there would be assurance that injured workers and their dependents would not 
become “objects of charity.”140 The new law was not seen as simply amending 
the common law but as promoting “the public welfare as directly as does 
insurance of bank depositors from loss.”141  
What was significant about the events in New York, later paralleled in 
other parts of the country, is the dramatic break they represented from the 
common law tradition. Importantly, workers’ compensation laws rejected 
negligence law as a fair or adequate route to providing injured workers with 
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the resources they needed to cope with workplace injuries. Instead, through a 
system of employer-provided insurance, enterprises for the first time were 
routinely required to compensate employees for the risks of injury they faced 
at the workplace. The history behind the struggle for workers’ compensation 
thus suggests that there is little to support the narrative of similarity and 
continuity that the Supreme Court has projected and instead much to indicate 
contrast and change.  
In light of this history, it seems anomalous to borrow from the common 
law of agency or tort to determine employee rights to compensation against 
their employers. Instead, we might take a page from history and import the 
lesson that the common law has definitively proven to be inadequate when it 
comes to employee rights. There is really little of value to borrow here. 
VI. TITLE VII: THE SECOND MAJOR INTERVENTION 
The foregoing discussion of workers’ compensation laws is meant to show 
only that tort law is not the best source of guidance for Title VII cases and is 
not meant to suggest that injuries for sexual harassment or other forms of 
discrimination are currently compensable or should be compensable under 
state workers’ compensation laws. Despite the fact that both workers’ 
compensation and Title VII address compensation for injuries, the scope of 
each is decidedly different. Notably, workers’ compensation schemes have 
never been expanded to provide secure and adequate recovery for 
discriminatory harms. They generally cover only injuries arising from 
“accidents,”142 with many states providing no compensation for victims of 
sexual harassment or other discriminatory harms arising from the wrongful 
conduct of supervisors and co-workers.143 Moreover, given that recovery for 
sexual harassment claims under workers’ compensation laws is so meager in 
those states that do provide coverage, it is generally employers, rather than 
employees, who have taken the position that workers’ compensation is the 
proper venue for such claims.144 Finally, because such discriminatory injuries 
are most often non-physical or economic in nature, there is still very little 
                                                                                                                     
 142 See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 2 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
LAW § 42.01 (2004) (“The requirement that the injury be accidental in character has been 
adopted either legislatively or judicially by the overwhelming majority of states.”).  
 143 See, e.g., King v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (W.D. Ark. 
1991) (holding that sexual harassment claim does not fall within scope of workers’ 
compensation); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 434–36 (Ohio 1991); see also 
Ruth C. Vance, Workers’ Compensation and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A 
Remedy for Employees, Or a Shield for Employers?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 141, 146 
(1993) (explaining that workers’ compensation was not meant to address individual rights 
violated by sexual harassment but instead “has as its policy the redressing of industrial 
injuries”). 
 144 See Jane Byeff Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual 
Harassment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1384 (1993).  
1340 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
protection under tort law, which provides full recovery mostly for physical 
harms.145 
In my story of contrast and change, this is the point at which Title VII 
comes into play. I regard the passage of Title VII as the second major 
intervention into the employer–employee relationship, marking another radical 
social reform on par with workers’ compensation. Title VII came into being in 
part because private tort law was inadequate and could not be counted upon to 
provide adequate relief against discriminatory harms. Under this account, it 
simply turns history on its head to think of Title VII claims as mere statutory 
torts.  
Not unlike the genesis of workers’ compensation, Title VII owes its 
existence to a larger social movement and was understood by all at the time to 
represent a dramatic break from the past.146 Fifty years later, Title VII and the 
other portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 still stand out as signature 
legislative accomplishments of the twentieth century that were necessary 
precisely because the law in the United States, including the common law, did 
little to protect African-Americans from discrimination, particularly in the 
private sector.147 The objective of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the civil 
rights movement more generally, was sweeping in its scope: it was aimed at 
nothing short of transforming racial relations across the country. To break with 
the Jim Crow legacy of the post-Reconstruction South and the myriad forms of 
racial discrimination present in the rest of the nation, civil rights proponents 
enlisted the national law to attack pervasive racial hierarchy and 
subordination.148 As one scholar put it, “[i]f ever any piece of legislation 
showed the power of the central government to change deeply entrenched 
patterns of behavior, it was the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”149 
The idea that private employers would no longer be allowed to select 
employees on the basis of race or to structure their workplaces and 
compensation systems along racial lines was an idea strongly resisted by 
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Southerners and many other foes of civil rights who had been successful in 
beating back fair employment laws in Congress for quite some time.150 This 
status quo would likely have persisted well into the latter half of the twentieth 
century were it not for the success of the civil rights movement. Only after 
President Kennedy was pressured to respond to calls for legislation on the 
heels of the high profile confrontation in Birmingham, Alabama, between 
supporters of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and those of Eugene “Bull” 
Connor, Birmingham’s infamous police commissioner, did passage of a strong 
civil rights bill become feasible.151 A bitter fight in Congress followed, 
complete with a classic filibuster in the Senate, all occurring alongside tumult 
in the larger society, including the March on Washington and the assassination 
of President Kennedy. In the end, while civil rights proponents did not get all 
that they had hoped for, the legislation that finally passed was broader than 
that originally proposed and contained a significant title—now referred to 
simply as Title VII—that was considered the liberals’ “biggest prize.”152 As 
the “most contentious, controversial, and longest title in the 1964 Act,”153 
Title VII ushered in what scholars have described as a new direction in 
employment discrimination law, giving courts significant new power to define 
“discrimination” in ways that responded to workplace realities.154 In short, 
Title VII was a major achievement, envisioned not as an appendage to private 
law, but as a bold initiative aimed at changing longstanding customs and 
practices.  
Specifically, Title VII took aim at the heart of the U.S. private enterprise 
system, limiting the at-will system of employment and cutting into 
management’s “prerogative” to decide how to run a business.155 While Title 
VII only forbids discrimination in employer decisionmaking on the basis of 
the five grounds specified in the Act, there is little question that it has altered 
the basic terms of the employer–employee relationship in a significant way.156 
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It bears mentioning that, absent such legislation, private employers are 
presumably free to act unreasonably—to hire, fire, or otherwise adversely 
affect their employees for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.157 The 
effect of Title VII, and similar anti-discrimination legislation, was to curb 
employers’ discretion in matters that the common law generally had not seen 
fit to regulate, even though securing and retaining employment is vital to most 
individuals. For this reason, it is anomalous to regard Title VII as a statutory 
tort, continuous with the prior body of common law. Rather, as a new body of 
public law, Title VII established a new civil right of equal job opportunity, 
representing a clear break with the de-regulatory common law regime that was 
partly responsible for its birth.  
With respect to sexual harassment claims in particular, it is ahistorical to 
regard Title VII claims as statutory torts. Unlike claims for discriminatory 
discharges, discriminatory failures to hire or promote, or wage discrimination 
that were the staple of early Title VII lawsuits, claims for discriminatory 
harassment did not emerge until well into Title VII’s second decade.158 As 
mentioned earlier,159 the cause of action for sexual harassment had grassroots 
origins, developed by feminist academics and activists in the late 1970s. They 
were moved to action because they recognized that neither tort law, nor 
existing Title VII law, provided relief for working women who suffered 
reprisals for refusing the sexual advances of their supervisors or were 
confronted with sexually humiliating and disparaging remarks and behavior on 
a regular basis. Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon, a key figure in the feminist 
movement based her case for recognition of sexual harassment as a Title VII 
civil rights violation in large part by demonstrating that tort law had failed 
miserably to protect women from such harms.160 She argued that sexual 
harassment claims should be redirected away from the “disabling (and 
cloying) moralism” of tort law161 and adjudicated under the statute that puts 
women’s equality concerns front and center.  
As a result of such pressure, the significant development of sexual 
harassment as a legal claim has largely proceeded under Title VII, with tort 
law playing only a supplemental role. Although some feminists, including 
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myself, have argued for a greater role for tort law in redressing harassment, 
this is a far cry from considering harassment claims to be quintessentially 
statutory torts.162 The move by the Supreme Court to do so belies the origin of 
the claim and subtly undermines the core notion that sexual harassment is not 
simply an individualistic injury but a weapon of inequality that perpetuates 
and reinforces women’s inferior status in the workplace. 
VII. A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT 
Although fundamentally misleading and distorting, the narrative of 
similarity and continuity and the designation of Title VII claims as statutory 
torts is already quite well entrenched in the Supreme Court precedents. 
 Although the Court created this state of affairs, I do not think it can easily 
fix it at this point, even if a future Court were so inclined. As this Symposium 
so well documents, the tort label has infiltrated a variety of key Title VII 
doctrines and has done particular damage with respect to vicarious liability. I 
fear that a majority of the Court has lost sight of the primary goal of Title 
VII—to prevent discrimination in the workplace—and has forgotten that Title 
VII is an enterprise liability scheme designed to put pressure on employers to 
root out discriminatory practices, largely because the employer is in the best 
position to do so. Instead, the path it has chosen since Ellerth and Faragher 
commits itself to treating formal structures and the exercise of formal power as 
more important than informal structures and informal power, even though 
those who study organizations will tell you that informal structures and the 
culture of the organization are better guides to predicting how individuals will 
behave in the organization.  
As has been the case in the past,163 there is a need for Congress to step in 
and pass yet another Civil Rights Restoration Act. In 2016, it will have been 
twenty-five years since the last big fix in 1991, a generation that has not been 
kind to Title VII law. In particular, it is high time that we finally bury the 
fellow-servant rule, and with it, the fundamentally wrong-headed policy that 
employers should not be held responsible for the injuries caused to their 
employees by other employees on the job. There is no longer any reason to 
pretend that employees are already compensated for such risks of employment 
through their wages, nor any reason to pretend that such risks are not a 
regularly-occurring outgrowth of their jobs. Because the enterprise exposes 
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employees to these extra risks, providing secure compensation is the best way 
to ameliorate the hardship to injured employees and deter future 
discrimination. 
This time I hope Congress keeps it simple. Any new Civil Rights 
Restoration Act should hold employers strictly liable for discriminatory acts of 
their employees—pure and simple.164 Given the structure of the Act and limits 
on remedies, we do not need further restrictions on vicarious liability. As they 
operate now, the threshold requirements for determining which acts are 
discriminatory will continue to serve as adequate liability limiting devices—
employers will continue to be liable only when the discriminatory acts of their 
employees cause economic harm165 or when they create a hostile environment, 
defined as severe or pervasive harassment,166 a very high threshold that is 
difficult to prove. Employees who are discharged or quit their jobs will 
continue to be required to mitigate their losses by seeking comparable 
employment.167 And, last but not least, compensatory and punitive damages 
will likely continue to be capped at a sum designed to avoid disproportionate 
liability.168 Imposing any additional restrictions on liability is overkill; it 
defeats the central aim of deterrence of discrimination and reduces Title VII to 
a puny weapon in the civil rights arsenal. 
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